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Franchisees' Optimism Bias and the Inefficiency
of the FTC Franchise Rule
Uri Benoliel* and Jenny Buchan**

A seminal assumption that underlies current franchise law is that
franchisees are intrinsicallyrational. As such, franchisees arepresumed
to be able to rationallyassess the risks involved in the franchise contract
and avoid those risks. Based on this rationalityassumption, current law
is predominantly based on the FTC Franchise Rule, in which
franchisorsare obliged to disclose to franchisees information regarding
future risks. Equipped with this information, franchisees, as rational
actors, are assumed to be capable of protecting themselves against the
franchise risks.
This Article questions the validity of the assumption that franchisees
are rational actors. Based on a significant body of existing empirical
research, which has thus far been overlooked in the legal debate over
the FTC Franchise Rule, this Article presents the following arguments.
First,although franchisees are often perceived as sophisticatedbusiness
people, they systematically suffer from a common psychological bias:
over-optimism about the future. Second, franchisees, being optimistically biased about the future, repeatedly avoid reading disclosure documents, which contain informative data about future risks. The
conclusion therefore is that the efficiency of the FranchiseRule in protecting franchisees is dubious.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A legal war is being waged between the advocates of franchisees
and franchisors. 1 On one side, franchisees' proponents, led mainly by
the American Association of Franchisees and Dealers ("AAFD"), 2 argue that sophisticated franchisors often behave opportunistically towards their less sophisticated franchisees. 3 Specifically, franchisors
are mainly blamed for opening new competing franchise units in too
close proximity to their existing franchisees, or unjustly terminating
the franchise contract only in order to resell the terminated unit to a
new franchisee for higher fees.4 Franchisees' advocates are consequently trying to persuade policy makers in numerous states to enact
laws that protect franchisees against such opportunistic behavior by
their franchisors. For example, in California, a new bill, known as
"Senate Bill 610," was recently enacted in order to protect franchisees
against franchisor abuse. 5 Similarly, a new bill in Pennsylvania called
the "Responsible Franchise Practices Bill," was recently proposed in
an effort to protect franchisee against franchisor opportunism. 6 In
Maine, a bill called the "Small Business Investment Protection Act,"
was introduced, which aims to defend franchisees against franchisor
exploitation. 7 Likewise, in Vermont, "House Bill 694" was proposed
as an effort to protect franchisees against franchisor opportunism. 8 In
Massachusetts, "An Act Further Regulating Franchise Agree1. See infra Part II.
2. See The AAFD Story, AM. Assoc. OF FRANCHISEES AND DEALERS, https://www.aafd.org/
the-aafd-story/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014), for information about the AAFD.
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. Id.
5. Franchises, S. Res. 610, 113th Leg. (Cal. 2014) (enacted).
6. Responsible Franchise Practices, H.R. 1620, 113th Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2013) (enacted); see
also Nancy Lanard, Pennsylvania HB 1620, the "Responsible FranchisePractices Bill", LANARD
L. BLOG (Feb. 25, 2014, 10:11 AM), http://www.spadealaw.com/blog/2014/02/25/pennsylvania-hb1620-responsible-franchise-practices-bill.
7. H.R. Res. 1458, 126 Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 2014); see also J. Craig Anderson, Maine Bill Aims
to Protect Franchise Owners, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 28, 2014, available at http://www
.pressherald.com/2014/01/28/franchisee-owners-square-off-against-Corporate-franchisors.over
-proposed-bill; Don Sniegowski, Maine Introduces Groundbreaking Franchise Bill, BLUE
MAUMAU (Feb. 7, 2013, 2:17 PM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/12612/bill-introducedmaine
-protectfranchisees.
8. H.R. Res. 694, 2012 Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2012); see also Perry J. McGuire & Nicholas C.
Rueter, Policy and Legislative Updates: Vermont FranchiseRelationship/TerminationLegislation,
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ments" was introduced with the goal of safeguarding franchisees
against franchisor misconduct. 9 In the same vein, in New Hampshire,
a franchisee protection bill called "The New Hampshire Small Business Investment Protection Act" was recently introduced in an effort
to reduce franchisor opportunism towards their franchisees. 10 In
other several states, franchisee protection laws are likely to be introduced in the near future."
On the other side of the battle, franchisors, supported by the in12
tense lobby of the International Franchise Association ("IFA"),
strongly resent these laws. 13 Deeply ingrained in franchisor advocates' opposition to such legislation is the belief that the current federal disclosure legal regime, known as "the Franchise Rule,"
sufficiently protects franchisees against potential franchisor opportunism. 14 According to the Franchise Rule enacted by the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"),1 5 each franchisor is obliged to disclose to potential franchisees - before they sign the franchise contract - informa16
tion indicating risk of future opportunism by the franchisor.
Equipped with this information, prospective franchisees can allegedly
assess the risks of franchisor opportunism, and therefore protect
17
themselves, ex ante, against potential abuse by the franchisor.
Franchisor advocates' opposition to franchisee protection laws has
been influential in the development of franchise law at this stage of
the legal battle. To date, several states have already refused to adopt
the novel franchisee protection laws. 18 For example, in California,
Governor Jerry Brown announced that he has vetoed Senate Bill 610,

SMITH, GAMBRELL, & RUSSELL, LLP (Mar. 2012), http://www.sgrlaw.com/resources/newsletters/

franchise law newsletter/1808/1810/.
9. S. Res. 1843, 187th Gen. Court (Mass. 2012).
10. H.R. Res. 1215, 2014 Gen. Court (N.H. 2014) (enacted); see also Don Sniegowski, New
Hampshire Franchisees a No Show for Protection, BLUE MAUMAu (Feb. 7, 2014, 10:22 AM),
http://www.bluemaumau.org/new-hampshire-franchisees-noshow_protection.
11. Anderson, supra note 7.
12. See About IFA, INT'L FRANCHISE Assoc., http://www.franchise.org/aboutifa.aspx (last visited Dec. 29, 2014), for information about the IFA.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. Id.

15. See About the FTC, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Dec. 29, 2014), for information about the FTC.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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essentially blocking the bill. 19 Similarly, Maine's state senate voted
against the Small Business Investment Protection Act.20
This Article questions the validity of franchisor advocates' central
argument: that the Franchise Rule is sufficient in protecting franchisees against franchisor opportunism. Based on a significant body of
existing empirical research, which has thus been far overlooked in the
legal debate over franchisee protection laws, this Article argues the
following. First, although franchisees are often perceived as sophisticated business people, 21 they systematically suffer from a common
psychological bias: over-optimism about the future. 22 Second, franchisees, being optimistically biased about the future, repeatedly avoid
reading disclosure documents, which contain informative data about
future risks.23 The conclusion therefore is that the efficiency of the
Franchise Rule in protecting franchisees is dubious.
This Article will proceed as follows: Part II will provide legal context by briefly reviewing the legal battle over franchisee protection
laws while outlining the central argument on which franchisor advocates base their opposition to franchisee protection laws: namely, that
the Franchise Rule sufficiently protects franchisee against franchisor
opportunism. Part III will present the authors' critique of the
franchisor advocates' argument. Part IV provides a brief conclusion.
II.
A.

THE WAR OVER FRANCHISEE PROTECTION LAWS - OVERVIEW

The Franchisees' Side: The Risk of FranchisorOpportunism

According to franchisee advocates, franchisors inherently have superior economic power and superior bargaining power in the negotia19. Don Sniegowski, California's Governor Brown Vetoes Franchisee Bill, BLUE MAUMAU
(Sept. 30, 2014, 12:03 AM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/14147/californiaE2%80%99sgover
norbrownvetoesfranchiseebill.
20. Don Sniegowski, Maine's Senate Kills FranchiseProtection Bill, BLUE MAUMAU (Apr. 4,
2014, 9:01 AM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/13791/maine-senate-killsfranchise.protectionbill [hereinafter Maine's Senate].
21. See Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970
F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The Sigels are not vulnerable consumers or helpless workers.
They are business people who bought a franchise .... "); see also Broussard v. Mieneke Discount
Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 348 (4th Cir. 1998) ("By all lights, Meineke franchisees are
independent, sophisticated, if sometimes small, businessmen who dealt with Meineke at arms'
length and pursued their own business interests."); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Jabush, 89 F.3d 109,
113 (2d Cir. 1996) ("As purchasers of a Subway sandwich franchise, the Spearses '[were] not
vulnerable consumers or helpless workers. They [were] business people who bought a
franchise."').
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.B.
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tion of the terms and conditions of the franchise contract. 2 4 Such
superiority is sometimes exploited by franchisors behaving opportunistically towards their franchisees.2 5 Franchisors opportunistic behavior can take numerous forms, which are often permitted under the
one-sided franchise contract: First, the franchisor might open a new
unit in close geographic proximity to an existing franchisee to directly
compete with this franchisee.2 6 Such an action, known as "territorial
encroachment," might dramatically reduce the existing franchisee's
profits and in some cases even cause her business failure. 27 In addition, the franchisor may force its franchisees to buy from a specific
supplier at an excessive price.2 8 In addition, the franchisor may receive rebates from suppliers at the expense of its franchisees. 29 Moreover, franchisors might opportunistically force one-sided
modifications of agreements on franchisees by threatening to terminate the franchise relationship at will. 30 In addition, the franchisor
might opportunistically terminate the franchise contract during its
term only in order to appropriate the profits of a successful franchisee
unit. Such abusive behavior, known as "churning," 3 1 can take two
24. See, e.g., Peter C. Lagarias & Robert S. Boulter, The Modern Reality of the Controlling
Franchisor:The Case for More, Not Less, Franchisee Protections, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 139, 139
(2010) ("franchisors continue to maintain and exploit their systemic economic superiority vis-Avis franchisees ...most franchise agreements are drafted by a franchisor's lawyers to benefit the
franchisor in every possible way and are usually presented to franchisees on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis").
25. See Maine's Senate, supra note 20 (Franchise owners have complained "that their businesses are being stolen or abused by franchisors"); Matt Ellis, Dunkin' Donuts FranchiseOwners
Applauds Joint Committee's Efforts for FairFranchisingLegislation, DUNKIN DONUTS INDEPENDENT FRANCHISE OWNERS (May 7, 2012), http://ddifo.org/dunkin-donuts-franchise-owners-ap-

plauds-joint-committees-efforts-for-fair-franchising-legislation/
("Franchising suffers when
franchisors abuse the power granted them in their franchise agreements and wipe out the equity
that's been built and the personal money that's been invested").
26. See, e.g., W. Michael Garner, A Termination By Any Other Name, BLUE MAUMAU (Feb.
14, 2008, 5:22 PM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/a-terminationbyany-other-name.
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., Robert Purvin, Franchising Myth Seven: You Lower the Cost of Doing Business
through the Power of Group Purchasing, BLUE MAUMAU (June 13, 2013, 5:36 AM), http://www

.bluemaumau.org/franchising-myth sevenbuying-franchise means you.lowercost-doingbus
iness-through-power-group-purchasing.
29. See id.
30. See Munno v. Amoco Oil Co., 488 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 (D. Conn. 1980); Boyd A. Byers,
Making a Case for FederalRegulation of FranchiseTerminations- A Return of Equity Approach,
19 IowA J. CORP. L. 607, 621 (1994); Michael J.Lockerby, FranchiseTermination Restrictions: A
Guide for Practitionersand Policy Makers, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 791, 833 (1986).

31. See JUSTIN G. LONGENECKER ET AL., SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: LAUNCHING &
GROWING ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURES 112 (2011); Michelle Hammond, Franchisees Call for
Action on "Churning" and "Good faith" in Government's Franchise Review, SMART COMPANY
(Feb. 11, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.smartcompany.com.au/growth/franchising/30255-franchisees-call-for-action-on-churning-and-good-faith-in-government-s-franchise-review.html.
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central forms: 1) the franchisor might terminate the contract of an efficient franchisee who fully complies with the franchise contract in order to sell the latter's profitable unit to a new franchisee for higher
franchise fees; 32 and, 2) the franchisor may terminate the contract of
an efficient franchisee simply in order to manage the successful unit
33
himself.
Given the risk of franchisor opportunism, franchisee advocates have
34
been calling on policymakers to enact laws that protect franchisees.
For example, in order to protect them against territorial encroachment, franchisee advocates have called on policy makers to enact laws
that restrict the ability of a franchisor to open new units in unreasonable proximity to their existing franchisees. 3 5 Similarly, franchisee advocates have been calling policymakers to protect franchisees against
opportunistic hold-ups and churning by enacting laws that restrict the
ability of franchisors to terminate a franchisee without showing "good
36
cause."
B.

The Franchisors'Side: Reliance on the FTC
FranchiseDisclosure Rule

Franchisors, supported by the relentless lobbying by the IFA,
strongly oppose the adoption of franchisee protection laws. 37 One
central argument that underlies their opposition is that the FTC
32. LONGENECKER ET AL., supra note 31, at 112; ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE,
THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 271 (2005); Neptune T.V. & Appliance Serv. Inc. v. Litton

Microwave Cooking Products, Div., Litton Systems, Inc., 462 A.2d 595, 601 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1983).
33. BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 32, at 271; see also Byers, supra note 30, at 621; Lockerby, supra note 30, at 834; David Hess, The Iowa FranchiseAct: Towards ProtectingReasonable
Expectations of Franchiseesand Franchisors,80 IOWA L. REV. 333, 334 (1995); Tracey A. Nicastro, Note, How The Cookie Crumbles: The Good Cause Requirement For Terminating A
Franchise Agreement, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 785, 801 (1994); Mark Pruitt, Disclosure and Good
Cause Legislation: "Where's the Beef' in Franchise Regulation?, 90 COM. L.J. 563, 565 (1985);
see, e.g., Maine's Senate, supra note 20 ("Franchise owners ... have complained that their businesses are being stolen or abused by franchisors.").
34. See supra Part I.
35. See Responsible Franchise Practices, H.R. 1620, 113th Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2013); see also
H.R. Res. 1458, 126 Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 2014); H.R. Res. 694, 2012 Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2012).
36. See H.R. 1620, 113th Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2013); see also H.R. Res. 1458, 126 Leg., 1st Sess.
(Me. 2014); H.R. Res. 694, 2012 Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2012).
37. See, e.g., Why FranchiseesShould Oppose California Senate Bill 610, Franchise Relationship Legislation, INT'L FRANCHISE Assoc. (July 2014), http://protectcabusiness.com/wp-content/

uploads/2014/07Why-zees-should-oppose-SB-610.pdf; CaliforniaFranchiseLegislation Defeated,
IFA FRANBLOG (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.ifafranblog.com/california-franchise-legislation-defeated/; see also Andrew A. Caffey, The Proposed Uniform FranchiseAct: The FranchisorViewpoint, 5 FRANCHISE L. J. 7, 7 (1986) ("The IFA insists . . . on a simple legislative principle: that
government should not intrude in the free marketplace unless there are compelling reasons").
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Franchise Rule sufficiently protects franchisee against franchisor
38
opportunism.
The Franchise Rule is a pre-sale disclosure rule that requires each
franchisor to provide potential franchisees with a franchisor disclosure
document ("FDD") before they sign the franchise contract. 39 The
FDD contains information - in twenty-three distinct disclosure items
- regarding franchisor current policies and past conduct. 40 This information is intended to allow franchisees to evaluate the future risks of
franchisor opportunism. 4 1 For example, in order to allow franchisees
to assess the risk of opportunistic territorial encroachment, the FDD
must include the following details. First, the franchisor must disclose
whether it grants exclusive territory to its franchisees. 42 Second, if a
franchisor does not offer its franchisees exclusive territory, the
franchisor must include a prescribed statement underscoring that
point, and a warning about the consequences of purchasing a franchise
in a non-exclusive territory. 4 3 Specifically, the franchisor must warn
the franchisee that she "may face competition from other franchisees
[in the future], from outlets [the franchiser] own[s], or from other
channels of distribution or competitive brands [that the franchisor]
control[s]. ' ' 44 Third, if the franchisor grants exclusive territory, it must
38. ABA ANTITRUST

SECTION: MONOGRAPH

No.

17, FRANCHISE

PROTECTION:

LAWS

32 (A.B.A.
1990); Donald P. Horwitz & Walter M. Volpi, Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 54 St.
JOHN'S L. REV. 217, 249 (1980); Nicastro, supra note 33, at 806; Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise
Relationship Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, 45 Bus. LAWYER 289, 314 (1989); William L.
Killion, The Modern Myth of the Vulnerable Franchisee: The Case for a More Balanced View of
the Franchisor-Franchisee
Relationship, 28 FRANCHISE L.J. 23, 29 (2008); Andrew A. Caffey, The
Proposed Uniform Franchise Act: The Franchisor Viewpoint, 5 FRANCHISE L.J. 7, 7 (1986);
Pruitt, supra note 33, at 567-68; Report of the American BarAssociation Section of Antitrust Law
on Proposed Small Business Franchise Act, A.B.A. 7, (Dec. 13, 1999), available at http:/www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust-awreport-2ee95b.authcheckdam
.pdf; Bill Buckley, Franchise Owner 'Protections' Will Hurt a Rare Bright Spot in Today's Economy, BAGOR DAILY NEWS (May 26, 2015, 2:32 PM), http:/fbangordailynews.com/2014/03/18/
opinion/franchise-owner-protections-will-hurt-a-rare-bright-spot-in-todays-economy; cf. James
A. Brickley et al., The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws, 34 J.L. & ECON. 101,
111 (1991).
AGAINST TERMINATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ADDITIONAL FRANCHISES

39. See Judith M. Bailey & Dennis E. Wieczorek, Franchise Disclosure Issues, FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING 95, 96 (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden eds., 3d ed. 2008), for the

history of the Franchise Rule.
40. See Bailey & Wieczorek, supra note 39, at 103-116, for an overview of the FDD items.
41. FTC Issues Updated Franchise Rule, FTC (Jan. 23, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2007/01/ftc-issues-updated-franchise-rule.
42. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(1)(5) (2015).
43. Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions, Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunities, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444, 15,491 (Mar. 30, 2007) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 436 & 437).
44. 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(l)(5)(i).
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disclose the circumstances that permit the franchisor to modify the
45
franchisee's territorial rights in the future.
Furthermore, in order to allow the potential franchisee to assess the
future risk of opportunistic hold-ups and churning by their franchisor,
the FDD must contain the following details. First, the franchisor must
summarize the conditions under which it may terminate the franchise
contract. Specifically, if the franchisor has a right to terminate the
contract at-will, it must disclose this right in a specified tabular format. 46 Second, the FDD must disclose the yearly rate of franchisees
that were terminated in the past by their franchisor. 47 Third, the
franchisor must disclose contact information of former franchisees
that were terminated by the franchisor. 48 This information is intended
to allow prospective franchisees to investigate the causes for past termination of franchisees, and therefore assess the future risks of oppor49
tunistic termination by the franchisor.
In order to assist franchisees to effectively assess the risks of
franchisor opportunism, the Franchise Rule furthermore requires that
the FDD meet several formal standards. First, the language of the
FDD must be clear.50 The FDD must use plain English, namely" a)
"understandable by a person unfamiliar with the franchise business";
b) "incorporate[ing] short sentences; definite, concrete, [and] ...active voice"; c) excluding "legal jargon, highly technical business terms,
52
and multiple negatives. '51 Second, the FDD must be concise. It
should not include any information other than that required or permitted by the Franchise Rule.5 3 Third, the disclosed information must
be assembled. In other words, the franchisor must disclose all re45. § 436.5(l)(5)(ii).
46. § 436.5(q) & Item 17 Table.
47. § 436.5(t) & Item 20, Table No. 3.
48. § 436.5(t)(5).
49. Mario Herman, Don't Be a Victim of Franchise Fraud, aka, Churning - Understanding
Item 20 Part2, http://www.franchiseknowhow.com/legal-corner/churning2.htm (last visited May
15, 2015) ("[A] careful review of Item 20 [of the Franchise Rule] can disclose some red flags
which might help to prevent you from falling victim to franchise ... churning. Is there a high
turnover rate? What are the reasons for the turnover rate?"); see Look before You Leap: A
Guide to Buying a Franchise,CAL. DEP'T OF CORPS. 5 (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.dbo.ca
.gov/Licensees/franchise investment law/pdflLookBeforeYouLeapENG.pdf ("Questions to
ask a former franchisee: If there was a termination or non-renewal, did the franchisor explain
why... ?").
50. 16 C.F.R. § 436.6(b).

51. § 436.1(o).
52. § 436.6(b).
53. § 436.6(d). "For example, franchisors may not include testimonials or promotional literature in a disclosure document." FranchiseRule 16 C.ER. Part436 Compliance Guide, FTC 122
(May 2008), available at http://www.business.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/bus70-franchise-rulecompliance-guide.pdf [hereinafter Compliance Guide].
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quired information in a single document, and the disclosure cannot be
55
done in multiple discrete parts.5 4 Fourth, the FDD must be storable.
Specifically, "the disclosure[ ] must be in a form that permits each
prospective franchisee to store, download, print, or otherwise maintain the document for future reference. '5 6 Fifth, the FDD must be
complete. It should specifically address each of the twenty-three disclosure items set forth in the Franchise Rule.5 7 If a particular disclo-

sure item is not applicable, then a negative response by the franchisor
is required that includes a reference to the type of information the
non-applicable item required to be disclosed. 58 Finally, the FDD must
be provided to the franchisee in a timely manner. Specifically, the
franchisee "must receive the disclosure document at least fourteen
calendar days before ... sign[ing] a binding franchise agreement with,
or make any payment to, the franchisor." 5 9
III.

THE THEORETICAL CRITIQUE

A seminal theoretical assumption that underlies the argument that
the Franchise Rule efficiently protects franchisees against franchisor
opportunism is that franchisees are intrinsically rational and are cognitively capable of rationally assessing the future risks of franchisor opportunism. 60 As the FTC explains, the current federal disclosure
regime is based on the theory that an informed franchisee "can determine whether a franchise deal is in his or her best interest. ' 61 Like-

wise, the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the FTC explains that the
current disclosure regime is "a cost-effective way to provide material
information to prospective franchisees so they can assess the costs...
54. Compliance Guide, supra note 53, at 121. For example, a franchisor may not list lawsuits
in Item 3 and then provide a link to external documents that explain the suits in great detail.
55. 16 C.F.R. § 436.6(b).
56. Id. For example, when disclosure documents are furnished as an email attachment or
made accessible online, they must be in a format that a prospective franchisee can download
onto a computer, a CD-ROM, or the like. Compliance Guide, supra note 53, at 121.
57. 16 C.F.R. § 436.6(c).
58. Id. For example, if no financing is provided by the franchisor, it should disclose in item 10:
"We do not offer any direct or indirect financing." Compliance Guide, supra note 53, at 121-22.
59. 16 C.F.R. § 436.3(e)(2). Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions, Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunities, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444, 15,491 (Mar. 30, 2007) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pts. 436 & 437).
60. See Proposed Franchise Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 57,294, 57,294 (Oct. 22, 1999) (to be codified at
16 C.F.R. § 436) [hereinafter Proposed Franchise Rule]; Bureau of Consumer Protection, Staff
Report to the Federal Trade Commission and ProposedRevised Trade Regulation Rule (16 CFR
Part 436), FTC 6 (2004), available at http:l/www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
staff-report-bureau-consumer-protection-federa-trade-commission-and-proposed-revised-trade/
0408franchiserulerpt.pdf.
61. Proposed Franchise Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. at 57,294 (emphasis added).
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and potential financial risks involved in entering into a franchise relationship. ' 62 Given the assumption that franchisees can rationally assess the franchise risks, the FTC's long-held conclusion is that
'63
"informed [franchisee] choice is the best regulator of the market.
We argue that this conclusion and its underlying rationality assumption are questionable. As will be explained in more detail below, franchisees inherently suffer from a cognitive constraint, known as
optimism bias. In addition, franchisees, being overly optimistic about
the future, systematically avoid reading franchisee disclosure documents that contain data about future risks.
A.

FranchiseesAre Optimistically Biased

Empirical studies show that people at various ages, and in various
aspects of life, systematically suffer from an inherent bias: over-optimism. 64 For example, heavy smokers are optimistically biased about
their chances of reaching age seventy-five. 65 Regular smokers are optimistically biased about their risk of lung cancer, heart disease, and
emphysema. 66 Individuals are optimistically biased regarding their
likelihood of contracting HIV.67 Individuals are optimistically biased
about their chances of having health problems, such as heart attacks
or arthritis. 68 Women aged fifty to seventy are optimistically biased
about their risk of getting breast cancer. 69 Men aged forty-five to sixty
62. Bureau of Consumer Protection, supra note 60, at 6 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 11.
64. "The optimism bias is defined as the difference between a person's expectation and the
outcome that follows. If expectations are better than reality, the bias is optimistic ....
"See Tali
Sharot, The Optimism Bias, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY R941, R941 (2011).
65. Michael Schoenbaum, Do Smokers Understand the Mortality Effects of Smoking? Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey?, 87 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 755, 758 (1997).
66. Tracy Williams & Valerie A. Clarke, Optimistic Bias in Beliefs About Smoking, 49 AUSTL.
J. PSYCHOLOGY 106, 110 (1997); see also N. D. Weinstein et al., Smokers' Unrealistic Optimism
About Their Risk, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 55, 58 (2005).
67. See, e.g., Meg Gerrard, Final Report, Antecedents of Pregnancyand Pregnancy Attrition in
First Term Women Marines, OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH 55-56 (Nov. 1, 1989), available at
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA216868; R. S. Gold & H. M. Aucote, 'I'm Less at
Risk than Most Guys'. Gay Men's Unrealistic Optimism About Becoming Infected with HIV, 14
INT'L. J. STD AIDS 18, 21-22 (2003); Shelley E. Taylor et al., Optimism, Coping, Psychological
Distress, and High-Risk Sexual Behavior Among Men at Risk of Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS), 63 J. PERS. SoC. PSYCHOLOGY 460, 469 (1992); J. van der Pligt et al., Perceived Risk of AIDS. Unrealistic Optimism and Self-Protective Action, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF HIV INFECTION 39, 54 (J. B. Pryor & G. D. Reeder, eds. 1993).
68. See Christopher Peterson & Mechele E. De Avila, Optimistic Explanatory Style and the

Perception of Health Problems, 51 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 128, 131 (1995); see also Vera
Hoorens & Brain P. Buunk, Social Comparison of Health Risks: Locus of Control, the PersonPositivity, and Unrealistic Optimism, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 291, 298 (1993).
69. Valerie A. Clarke et al., Unrealistic Optimism and the Health Belief Model, 23 J. BEHAV.
MED. 367, 371-72 (2000).
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are optimistically biased about their risk of getting prostate cancer. 70
Cancer patients who are enrolled in clinical cancer trials are optimistically biased about the possibility of their cancer being controlled by
drugs administered in the trials. 71 Drivers aged sixty-five and above
are optimistically biased about their driving risks. 72 College students
are optimistically biased about their risk of being involved in a traffic

accident. 73 Motorcyclists are optimistically biased about their risk of
having a serious road accident. 74 College students are optimistically
biased about positive life events, such as liking their post-graduation
job or owning their own home. 75 College students are also optimistically biased about negative life events, such as having a drinking problem or being fired from a job. 76 Individuals are optimistically biased
about their risk of committing suicide or becoming addicted to
drugs. 77 Individuals who had recently applied for a marriage license
78 Stuare optimistically biased about the longevity of their marriage.
dents who experienced an earthquake are optimistically biased, a
couple of months after the earthquake, about their risk of being hurt
in a natural disaster. 7 9 Novice bungee jumpers are optimistically bi80
ased about their risk of injury.

Equally, empirical studies consistently show that business people,
although being often perceived as less vulnerable than non-business
70. Id. at 371-74.
71. Lynn A. Jansen et al., Unrealistic Optimism in Early-PhaseOncology Trials, 33 IRB: ETHics & HUMAN RESEARCH 1, 4 (2011).

72. See Dominique Gosselin et al., Comparative Optimism Among Drivers: An Intergenerational Portrait,42 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 734, 738 (2010); see also Ola Svenson et
al., Perceived Driving Safety and Seatbelt Usage, 17 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 119,

126 (1985).
73. David M. Dejoy, The Optimism Bias and Traffic Accident Risk Perception, 21 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 333, 338 (1989).

74. D. R. Rutter et al., Perceptions of Risk in Motorcyclists: Unrealistic Optimism, Relative
Realism and Predictionsof Behaviour, 89 BRITISH J. PSYCHOLOGY 681, 691-692 (1998).

75. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events, 39 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 806, 810-811 & 813 (1980).

76. Id.
77. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems, 5 J.
BEHAV. MED. 441, 446-450 (1982); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility
to Health Problems: Conclusionsfrom a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED. 481, 486,
488 (1987).
78. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage,17 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 439, 440 &

446 (1993).
79. Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, Changes in and Generalizationof Unrealistic Optimism Following Experiences with Stressful Events: Reactions to the 1989 California Earthquake,
18 PERS. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 39, 42 (1992).

80. Wendy Middleton et al., Give 'Em Enough Rope: Perception of Health and Safety Risks in
Bungee Jumpers, 15 J. SoC. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 68, 76 (1996).
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people, 81 are optimistically biased too. For example, Cooper, Woo
and Dunkelberg administered a survey to 2,994 entrepreneurs in various industries, who had recently become owners of businesses. 82 The
entrepreneurs were asked what the odds of their business succeeding
were. 83 They were also asked what the odds of any business like theirs
to succeed were. 84 The results show that the entrepreneurs in the
sample were optimistically biased. 85 To begin with, most entrepreneurs assessed "their own odds for success as far higher than would
'86
seem justified by the historic experience of new [entrepreneurs].
While the historic experience revealed "less than 50% of businesses
survive for more than five years, '87 entrepreneurs believed, on average, that their chances of success were 81%.88 In addition, "entrepreneurs perceive[d] their prospects for success as substantially better
than those for similar business[ ].-89 While entrepreneurs believed, on
average, that their chances of succeeding were, as mentioned above,
81%, they believed that the chances of any business like theirs to succeeding were, on average, only 59%. 90
Similarly, Pinfold administered a survey to 548 entrepreneurs "who
had started a business in the previous three months or intended to do
so in the next six months." 9 1 On average, entrepreneurs estimated
that the probability of their business surviving after five years was
75.7%, while the true rate was approximately 42.5% at that time. 92 In
the same vein, in a longitudinal study conducted by Arabsheibani,
Meza, Maloney and Pearson, self-employed individuals were asked to
81. For example, in the legal context, business people are often perceived as less vulnerable
and more sophisticated than members of the general population, such as consumers. See, e.g.,
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Jabush, 89 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1996); Original Great Am. Chocolate
Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992); Susan Saab
Fortney, Seeking Shelter in The Minefield of Unintended Consequences - The Traps of Limited
Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 717, 752 n.158 (1997); Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGs L.J. 459, 460
(1995).
82. Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs'Perceived Chances for Success, 3 J. Bus. VENTURING 97, 100-101 (1988).
83. Id. at 102.
84. Id. at 103.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 106.
87. Cooper et al., supra note 82, at 99.
88. Id. at 103.
89. Id. at 106.
90. Id. at 103.
91. John F. Pinfold, The Expectations of New Business Founders:The New Zealand Case, 39 J.
SMALL Bus. MGMT. 279, 280 (2001).

92. Id. at 280 & 281, Table 1.
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forecast their future financial situation. 93 The results of the study

show that 4.6 times as many individuals forecast an improvement in
their financial situation, but experienced deterioration, as forecasted
94
deterioration but experienced an improvement.
Within the field of franchising, empirical studies, which have thus

far been overlooked in the legal debate over the effectiveness of the
Franchise Rule, show that franchisees are not different from any other
people. These studies suggest that franchisees, although often perceived as sophisticated business people, 95 are systematically too opti-

mistic. For example, an empirical study conducted by Kalnins
suggests that franchisees are unrealistically optimistic regarding their

business capabilities. 96 The study analyzed 142 franchise contracts
with contractual clauses, known as 'development commitments,'
which specify a "number of units to be developed by a ...franchisee

in its territory within a certain time period.
61% of master franchisees

' 97

The study reveals that

did not survive to the end of their development commitment period.
Further, surviving franchisees typically came nowhere near to building the number of units specified by the development commitments.
Only 6 of the 55 [master franchisees] still ongoing at the end of their
development periods fulfilled or exceeded the commitment size.98

In the same vein, an empirical study conducted by Winter, Szulanski,
Ringov and Jensen suggests that franchisees are optimistically biased
about their business capabilities to uncover and implement novel business alternatives, which are superior to the ones provided by their experienced and knowledgeable franchisor. 99 The study found that

many franchisees deviate from the franchisor's original business
93. Gholamreza Arabsheibani et al., And a Vision Appeared Unto Them of a Great Profit:
Evidence of Self-Deception among Self-Employed, 67 ECON. LET-rERs 35, 36 (2000).
94. Id. at 37.
95. See Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970
F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The Sigels are not vulnerable consumers or helpless workers.
They are business people who bought a franchise .. ");see also Broussard v. Mieneke Discount
Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 348 (4th Cir. 1998) ("By all lights, Meineke franchisees are
independent, sophisticated, if sometimes small, businessmen who dealt with Meineke at arms'
length and pursued their own business interests."); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Jabush, 89 F.3d 109,
113 (2d Cir. 1996) ("As purchasers of a Subway sandwich franchise, the Spearses '[were] not
vulnerable consumers or helpless workers. They [were] business people who bought a
franchise."').
96. Arturs Kalnins, Overestimation and Venture Survival: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Development Commitments in InternationalMaster FranchisingVentures, 14 J. ECON. MGMT. STRAT. 933,

951 (2005).
97. Id. at 933.
98. Id. at 951.
99. See Sidney G. Winter et al., Reproducing Knowledge: Inaccurate Replication and Failurein
Franchise Organizations,23 ORGAN. Sci. 672, 682 (2012).
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model by providing their customers new products that are not part of
the original model. 100 In addition, the study empirically shows that
franchisee deviation from the franchisor business model increases
their risk of franchisee failure. 10 1
Another empirical study conducted by Grinhagen and Dorsch suggests that franchisees have "unrealistically [optimistic] expectations of
the franchisors" at the time they make a decision to start a
franchise.10 2 Franchisees were asked, among other things, to rate "the
value that [they] expected [to receive] from the franchisor at the time
that the franchise was started. ' 10 3 These franchisees were also asked
to rate the value they currently are experiencing from the
franchisor.' 0 4 The results, obtained from 206 franchisees from 14
franchise chains,10 5 reveal that franchisees, both single-unit and multiunit, reported "significantly stronger, positive perceptions of expected
franchisor value when asked about the time they started their
franchise relative to the ... current value they perceived to be receiving from their franchisors.' 0 6 Likewise, an empirical study by Blut,
Backhaus, Heussler, Woisetschliger and Ahlert strongly implies that
franchisees are optimistically biased about their potential profits, and
the level of training and support provided by the franchisor.10 7 Collecting data from 2,668 franchisees from 54 different franchise
chains, 10 8 the study shows that at the very beginning of the franchise
relationship, franchisees have relatively high levels of loyalty towards
their franchisors, 10 9 measured by their willingness to renew the
franchise agreement and to still purchase their franchise, if they had to
do over again. 10 However, one year into the franchise relationship,11 ' there is a significant decline in the franchisee's loyalty towards
the franchisor.1 2 One explanation for this decline is that at the begin100. Id. at 676.
101. Id. at 681.
102. Marko Gruinhagen & Michael J. Dorsch, Does the FranchisorProvide Value to Franchisees? Past, Current, and Future Value Assessments of Two Franchisee Types, 41 J. SMALL Bus.
MGMT. 366, 379 (2003).
103. Id. at 373.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 371-72.
106. Id. at 376.
107. See Markus Blut et al., What to Expect After the Honeymoon: Testing a Lifecycle Theory
of Franchise Relationships, 87 J. RETAILING 306, 309-10 (2011).
108. Id. at 311.
109. Franchisees scored their loyalty intentions as 5.24 out of 7. See id. at 318, Table 4.
110. See id. at 317, Table 2.
111. Id. at 312.
112. Franchisees scored their loyalty intentions as 4.08 out of 7, compared to 5.24 out of 7 at
the honeymoon phase. See Markus Blut et al., supra note 107, at 318, Table 4.
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ning of the franchise relationship, franchisees tend to be euphoric and
113
over-optimistic about entering a new phase in their working lives.
However, following this honeymoon stage, franchisees confront the
harsh reality and realize that the "high level[ ] of expectations towards
1' 14
profit, training, and support [were unrealistically optimistic].
Qualitative studies furthermore show that franchisees suffer from
an optimism bias. In an empirical qualitative study, conducted by Frazer, Weaven, Giddings and Grace, 115 "[a] series of 11 multiple case
studies, involving 30 protocol discussions with franchisors and franchisees, [were] undertaken." ' 16 Out of 22 total franchisees, 117 a strong
majority of franchisees self-identified that they had initially held unrealistically optimistic expectations at the pre-entry stages of entering
the franchise system. 118 As one franchisee explains: "Ireally believed
that I would get a good return on my investment and I would have
some flexibility [... ] but it just did not happen.... I could not understand how I got it so wrong."1 1 9 Unrealistic optimism on the part of
franchisees was also identified by franchisors, interviewed in the
study. For example, one franchisor stated that: "A lot of franchisees
have not reviewed their business operations rationally, and so there is
a gap between what they are expecting and what they actually receive."1 20 Similarly, another qualitative study conducted by Schell
and McGillis shows that franchisees are optimistically biased about
their sales volume.12 ' In this study, out of 37 franchisees, the majority
felt that the sales volume of their franchise during its first year of op122
eration was somewhat lower or significantly lower than expected.
B.

Biased Franchisees Ignore Disclosure Documents

On a theoretical level, optimism bias has potential negative implications for the willingness of individuals to seek information about their
potential risks: "[p]eople may simply avoid information that might
113. Id. at 309.
114. Id. at 309-310.
115. Lorelle Frazer et al.,
What Went Wrong? Franchisorsand FranchiseesDisclose the Causes
of Conflict in Franchising,15 QUALITATIVE MKT. RESEARCH INT. J. 87, 87 (2012).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 90.
118. Id. at 93.
119. Id. at 95-96.
120. Frazer et al., supra note 115, at 95.
121. Bernadette H. Schell & Sheila McGillis, How Type A FranchiseesCope with Failed Busi-

ness: An Analysis of Micro- and Macro-System Factors, 12 J. SMALL Bus. ENTRE. 27, 29 (1995).
122. Id. at 35-36.
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contradict their optimistic beliefs. ' 12 3 "If individuals perceive that
particular negative events are less likely to happen to them then it is
possible that they will pay less attention to risk-related information." 124 Individuals who are unrealistically optimistic about their
own abilities may not pay much attention to risk information, which
they may feel is mainly directed at other less careful or less skillful
125
individuals than themselves.
Indeed, empirical studies systematically show that people who are
optimistically biased about their risks are less likely to seek information about those risks. For example, in an experimental study conducted by Fowler and Geers, subjects who were undergraduate
students 126 were asked to provide their email address if interested in
attending informative seminars on health problems. 127 The study revealed that subjects who were optimistic about their health conditions
''were less likely than other subjects to seek ... health information"
by attending to the informative seminars. 28 In the same vein, in an
empirical study conducted by Radcliffe and Klein, "a sample consist[ing] of 146 subjects between the ages of 40 and 60,"129 were given
a choice to read about one heart-attack risk factor out of six, including
"alcohol consumption, fat consumption, nutrition, smoking, exercise
and stress.' 130 The study shows that subjects who were unrealistically
optimistic about their heart attack risk chose to read about a risk factor towards which they believed they possessed a favorable standing,
and they chose not to read about risk factors towards which they possessed less favorable standing.' 3 ' Likewise, according to an empirical
telephone survey, conducted by Lu, Dzwo, Hou and Andrews, 132 subjects who were optimistically biased about the risks of eating food
123. Deborah J. Wiebe & David Black, Illusional Beliefs in the Context of Risky Sexual Behaviors, 27 J. APPL. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1727, 1728 (1997).
124. Frank P. McKenna, It Won't Happen to Me. Unrealistic Optimism or Illusion of Control?,
84 BRITISH J. PSYCHOL. 39, 44 (1993).
125. See Marleen Decruyenare et al., Adolescents' Opinions about Genetic Risk Information,
PrenatalDiagnosis, and Pregnancy Termination, 32 J. MED. GENETICS 799, 803-04 (1995).
126. Stephanie L. Fowler & Andrew L. Geers, Dispositionaland Comparative Optimism Interact to PredictAvoidance of a Looming Health Threat, 30 PSYCHOLOGY HEALTH 456, 461 (2014).
127. Id. at 462.
128. Id. at 465.
129. Nathan M. Radcliffe & William M. P. Klein, Dispositional,Unrealistic,and Comparative
Optimism: Differential Relations With the Knowledge and Processing of Risk Information and
Beliefs About Personal Risk, 28 PERS. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 836, 839 (2002).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 844.
132. Hung-Yi Lu et al., Factors Influencing Information-Seeking Intentions and Support for
Restrictions: A Study on an Aresnic-Contaminated Frying Oil Event, 113 BRITISH FOOD J. 1439
(2011).
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cooked by arsenic-contaminated oil had less intention of seeking information regarding those risks. 133 Similarly, in an experimental study
conducted by Wiebe and Black,13 4 subjects "were chosen from nevermarried, heterosexual students taking an introductory psychology
course."'1 35 These subjects received an informative pamphlet, which
contained "[data] about contraception as well as about the specific
1' 36
advantages and disadvantages of several different contraceptives.'
Prior to reading the pamphlet, the optimistically-biased subjects,
namely participants whose behavioral risk was relatively high and
whose perceived risk were relatively low, 1 37 reported lower interest in

138
the pamphlet than did the more realistic subjects.
In the same vein, based on a survey with 699 members of an online
consumer panel, a study by Park, Ju and Kim reveals that as consumers are more optimistically biased about the future risk of depression,
139
they are less likely to seek information about this health problem.
More straightforwardly related to the debate over the effectiveness of
the FTC franchise disclosure rule on optimistically biased franchisees,
a recent empirical study by Anh, Park and Haley examined the relationship between consumers' optimism bias and their inclination to
read mandated legal disclosures. 40 By analyzing survey data of 404
consumers,' 4 ' the study reveals that optimistically biased consumers
are less likely to pay attention to the mandated legal disclosure on
drugs' health risks, which is required by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). 142 The study furthermore shows that optimistically
biased consumers are less likely to seek further information about the
143
drug's health risks through alternative sources.
Similarly, in the field of franchising, empirical and anecdotal evidence strongly implies that franchisees, being unrealistically optimistic
about future risks, systematically avoid reading the franchisors disclo133. Id. at 1442 & 1446.
134. Deborah J. Wiebe & David Black, IllusionalBeliefs in the Context of Risky Sexual Behaviors, 27 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1727 (1997).

135. Id. at 1729.
136. Id. at 1733.
137. Id. at 1731.
138. Id. at 1744.
139. Jin Seong Park et al., Direct-to-ConsumerAntidepressant Advertising and Consumers'
Optimistic Bias about the Future Risk of Depression: The ModeratingRole of Advertising Skepticism, 29 HEALTH COMMUN. 586, 589 & 592 (2014).

140. Ho-Young (Anthony) Ahn, Jin Seong Park & Eric Haley, Consumers' Optimism Bias
and Responses to Risk Disclosures in Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) PrescriptionDrug Advertising:
The Moderating Role of Subjective Health Literacy, 48 J. CONSUM. AFFAIRS 175 (2014).
141. Id. at 182.
142. Id. at 185.
143. Id.
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sure documents, which are aimed to protect franchisees against those
risks. For example, according to an empirical study conducted by
Kimberly Morrison, which is based on data collected by a mailed
questionnaire from 307 U.S. franchisees in various industries, most
franchisees ignore the franchise disclosure documents before investing
144
in the franchise.
This important empirical finding, which casts significant doubt on
the effectiveness of the FTC franchise disclosure rule, is supported by
countless statements by franchise legal experts. For example, Keith
Kanouse, a U.S. franchise attorney boasting twenty-two years of experience in franchise matters, claims that most prospective franchisees
simply do not read franchise disclosure documents. 145 Similarly, according the Franchise Business Law Group, which represents "large,
midsize, and small franchisors,' 1 46 "most franchisees who receive [the]
franchise disclosure document will not read the entire thing."'1 47 In
the same vein, Michael Daigle, who spent more than twenty years as
chief legal counsel for franchisors such as Blockbuster, Quiznos, Boston Market and Einstein Bagels and also served as Co-Chair of the
International Commercial Transactions, Franchising and Distribution
Committee of the American Bar Association Section of International
Law, 148 states that "[t]oo often, franchisees don't read ... disclosure
documents.' 1 49 Also, according to Mitchell Kassoff, who has been
representing both franchisors and franchisees in franchising matters in
all fifty states since 1979,150 many prospective franchisees do not read

144. Kimberley A. Morrison, An Empirical Test of a Model of FranchiseeJob Satisfaction, 34
J. SMALL Bus. MOMT. 27, 30, 31, Table 2 (1996). Likewise, qualitative in-depth interviews, conducted by John Clarkin, offer support for the view that prospective franchisees often do not read
a franchise disclosure documents before making their franchise purchase. John E. Clarkin, Entrepreneurial Opportunities and Performance in Franchising Firms 316 & 328 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sterling).
145. See Roberta Maynard, Choosing a Franchise,84 NATION'S Bus. 56, 62R (1996).
146. Franchise Business Law Group 30, YOUTUBE, (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=qlclBptzhNM (last visited Dec. 29, 2014); see also Our Clients, FRANCHISE BUSINESS
LAW GROUP, http://www.franchisebusinesslawgroup.com/about-us/clients/ (last visited Dec. 29,
2014).
147. FDD Fundamentals:Item 1,FRANCHISE BUSINESS LAW GROUP http://www.franchisebusinesslawgroup.com/fdd-fundamentals-item-1/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
148. Michael R. Daigle, CHEN6 COHEN, http://www.chengcohen.com/who-we-are/michael-rdaigle/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
149. Heather Blount, Treat Franchising like Marriage, http://www.sunbeltfoodservice.com
2013/07/04/treat-franchising-like-marriage/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
150. Mitchell J. Kassoff, EVANCARMICHAEL.COM, http://www.evancarmichael.com/Franchises/
2753/summary.php (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
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franchise disclosure documents. 51 In addition, according to David
Kaufmann, who wrote the New York's Franchise Disclosure Law and
served as Special Deputy Attorney General in the Franchise Section
of the New York Attorney General's office, 152 "many prospective
franchisees don't read the franchise disclosure document, cover to
153
cover."
Franchise industry experts too, repeatedly argue that franchisees
systematically ignore franchise disclosure documents. For example,
according to Arnie Williams, who spent 27 years in the franchise business at franchisor corporate level, 154 states that "being in the business
made it abundantly clear to me that most franchisees do not read their
[franchise disclosure documents]." 155 Likewise, according to Ginny
Wilmerding, a business strategy consultant and a former research associate at the Harvard Business School, too many franchisees do not
read franchise disclosure documents carefully. 156 Similarly, Tom
Portesy, President and Chief Executive Officer of MFV Expositions, a
company that produces the leading franchise events worldwide, states
that "many franchise prospects do not read the franchise disclosure
document."'' 57 Likewise, according to Eddy Goldberg, Managing Editor at Franchise Update Media, a leading integrated content provider
in franchising, "many franchisors bemoan the fact that candidates
don't read the [franchise disclosure document]. '158 Finally, a statement by FranNet, a franchisor and franchisee consultant company established in 1987, supports the assertion that franchisees, being
151. Is Franchising Highly Regulated, Top Franchisee Attorneys Weigh In, UNHAPPY FRAN(Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.unhappyfranchisee.com/is-franchising-regulated/ (last visited
Dec. 29, 2014).
152. Franchising, Licensing and Distribution:An Overview of Kaufnann Gildin's Franchise
Practice, KAUFMANN GILDIN & ROBBINS, LLP, http://www.kaufmanngildin.com/Franchise-Law/
Franchising-Licensing-and-Distribution.shtm (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
153. Chuck Green & Ben Brody, Benefits and Burdens of Owning a Franchise: Westchester
County Franchise Owners Face Challenges in a Bad Economy, Offer Tips, WINCHESTER MAGAZINE (2013), http://www.westchestermagazine.com/914-INC/Q1-2013/Benefits-and-Burdens-ofOwning-a-Franchise-Westchester-County-Franchise-Owners-Face-Challenges-in-a-Bad-Ecnomy-Offer-Tips/.
154. FranchisePlayers: What 27 Years in the FranchiseIndustry Taught Me About Becoming a
Franchisee, YAHOO! FINANCE (Apr. 29, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/fran
chise-players-27-years-franchise-110000311.html.
155. Id.
156. GINNY WILMERDING, SMART WOMEN AND SMALL BUSINESS: How TO MAKE THE LEAP
FROM CORPORATE CAREERS 89 (2006).
157. Tom Portesy, What FranchisorsExpect of Franchisees, FRANCHISE Expo (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://www.franchiseexpo.com/resources/industry-experts/august-2014/What-Franchisors-Expect-Of-Franchisees.
158. Eddy Goldberg, Getting Legal Advice, FRANCHISING.COM, http://www.franchising.com/
howtofranchiseguide/getting-legal-advice.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
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unrealistically optimistic, systematically ignore franchise disclosure
documents:
It's baffling to think that a franchisee would invest thousands of dollars in a business venture without knowing what he or she was getting into - especially when the law requires franchisors to disclose
detailed information about operations, costs, earning potential and
legal requirements.
But it happens. All the time. People get so excited about their business venture that they don't read the Franchise Disclosure Document, or just read the Item 7 expenditures and Item 19 earnings
information and skip over
the rest. Then they're caught by surprise
159
later when it's too late.
In addition to business experts' statements, anecdotal court cases repeatedly show that franchisees, in diverse industries, ignore franchise
disclosure documents. For example, in Ayu's Global Tire v. Big 0
Tires,160 when the franchisee investigated buying a tires store
franchise, the franchisor sent him several copies of its franchise disclosure document. 161 However, the franchisee admitted in his deposition
that he did not read the franchise disclosure document carefully. 162
Similarly, in Bakrac v. Villager Franchise Sys.,163 a hotel franchisor
mailed its franchisee a copy of its franchise disclosure document. 164
According to the court, "[the franchisee] did not read any part of the
[franchise disclosure document] other than the cover page.' 65 Similarly, in Massey v. Moe's Southwest Grill, LLC 166 the fast-food franchisee admitted that he did not read the franchise disclosure
document before buying his franchise. 67 Likewise, in TES Franchising v. Dombach,168 a business coaching franchisee self-confessed that
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IV.

CONCLUSION

A seminal assumption that underlies current franchise law is that
franchisees are intrinsically rational. As such, franchisees are presumed to be able to rationally assess the risks involved in the franchise
contract and avoid those risks. Based on this rationality assumption,
current law is predominantly based on the FTC Franchise Rule, in
which franchisors are obliged to disclose to franchisees information
regarding future risks. Equipped with this information, franchisees, as
rational actors, are assumed to be capable of protecting themselves
against franchisor opportunism risks.
This Article questions the validity of the assumption that franchisees are rational actors. Franchisees, although being business people
that make large investments in the franchise, are not different from
other people: they inherently suffer from a cognitive constraint,
known as optimism bias. Being overly optimistic about the future,
franchisees systematically avoid reading franchisee disclosure documents, which contain information about future risks. Since franchisees, being overly optimistic, persistently ignore disclosure documents,
the efficiency of the FTC Franchise Rule becomes questionable. Consequently, the door should be reopened to considering the adoption of
laws that substantially protect franchisees against franchisor potential
opportunism.

